Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role of European Private International Law by Van Den Eeckhout, V.
Promoting Human Rights within the
Union: The Role of European Private
International Law
Veerle Van Den Eeckhout*
Abstract: This article aims to contribute both to the ‘Refgov’ project, which is focused on
the ambition to find ways of promoting human rights within the EU, but also, more in
general and apart from the project, to an improved understanding of the crucial place
conflict of law rules occupy in the building of a common Europe—a highly political
question behind apparently technical issues. In the study the author deals with the para-
meters, points of interest, etc in relation to private international law which should be
heeded if European Member States ‘look at’ each other’s laws, and—in the context of the
‘Refgov’ project—if the idea is to exchange ‘best practices’ or harmonise substantive law,
or to harmonise private international law, etc further through a type of open method of
coordination. The contribution also shows that private international law issues are decisive
in respect of every evaluation of the impact of European integration on human rights, both
if this integration process takes place through ‘negative’ harmonisation (for example by
falling back on the principle of mutual recognition) and through ‘positive’ harmonisation.
I Introduction
A The Position of PIL: An Exotic Wallflower or a Well-Integrated Participant
in Various Companies?
For a long time, the discipline of private international law (PIL) appealed to a limited
number of lawyers only. Essentially, this may also still be the case, even though the tide
has been turning for some years now.
In recent years, this field has been given a new impetus mainly by Europe, and PIL
is now in full swing. On closer inspection, it turns out that the tide is turning in two
ways: on the one hand, PIL itself is undergoing an internal metamorphosis, both
formally and substantively, but, on the other hand, the relationship between PIL and
other fields is changing fundamentally as well. Due to this repositioning of PIL, it is
conceivable that PIL issues will appeal to an increasing number of lawyers. In a recent
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contribution,1 I described recent developments in PIL, specifically European PIL, as a
‘metamorphosis from an exotic wallflower into a well-integrated participant in a variety
of companies’. For example, PIL has seen an increasing focus on European integration
considerations.
B Point of Departure of the Analysis: The Importance of PIL for a Project
which is Focused on the Ambition to find ways of Promoting Human Rights within
the Union
Since PIL now keeps company with specialists in the fields of human rights, non-
discrimination law, European law, comparative law and the like, working together in
the project concerning the open method of coordination (OMC)2 in the field of human
rights, constituted within the ‘Reflexive Governance Research Project’ (the Refgov
project), the question arises as to what the position of PIL in this kind of company
should be. Can PIL be ignored in this kind of company and in this kind of project, or
should the discipline be integrated into the debates and questions, and could it even
play a prominent role in this kind of company? This contribution seeks to answer this
very question.
C The Limitations and Scope of the Article
It should be emphasised that this search for an answer will be of only an explorative
nature for the time being. This is merely an explorative study. Another limitation of this
article lies in the selective nature of the analysis. Aspects that could be quite
interesting—for example in relation to ownerships rights, the law of evidence, criminal-
law aspects, etc—will not be explicitly included in the analysis for the time being.
Nevertheless, the scope of this contribution may be wider than its title suggests in
some areas. For example, the following issues will be addressed: classical PIL questions
(questions relating to jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement), and
the doctrine of the ‘internationally mandatory rules’ (also known as the ‘règles
d’application immédiate’); both family law and non-family-law aspects of PIL; both
pure PIL issues and PIL issues connected with developments outside the strict PIL
domain—such as developments relating to unification and harmonisation of substan-
tive law; migration law developments; PIL issues related to aspects of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ integration.
1 V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Tien jaar Europees internationaal privaatrecht. Een verrassende metamorfose van
exotisch muurbloempje tot goed geïntegreerde deelnemer in diverse gezelschappen’ [’Ten Years of Euro-
pean Private International Law. A Surprising Metamorphosis from an Exotic Wallflower into a Well-
Integrated Participant in a Variety of Companies’], [2005] Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 289.
2 OMC can be briefly defined as follows (see, e.g., O. De Schutter and S. Deakin, ‘Introduction: Reflexive
Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation’, in O. De Schutter and S. Deakin (eds), Social Rights
and Market Forces. Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social
Europe? (Bruylant, 2005), 1): ‘The open method of coordination is one of a number of new governance
mechanisms which, from a theoretical point of view, are understood as performing a range of functions.
These include fostering mutual learning between the Member States and avoiding or limiting the phe-
nomenon of competitive deregulation in the internal market, while at the same time respecting the diversity
of national practices and the existing division of powers between the European Community and the
Member States’.
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Likewise, the article is not confined to issues explicitly involving human rights—
rights currently regarded as such, for example the right of privacy, the freedom of
expression, etc. It also deals with discussions that encompass concerns such as the
‘protection of the weak party’—for example concerns in relation to employee protec-
tion in international labour law.
II PIL: Relevant to the Refgov Project in at Least Three Ways
Let me begin by emphasising, in quite general terms, that the importance of PIL for the
Refgov project should not be overestimated, in my opinion. But even if PIL lawyers
should be modest about their input in this context, I believe that PIL may certainly be
crucially important in some respects and in a variety of manners. For example, PIL
could sometimes act as a catalyst in promoting human rights, as an injection mecha-
nism and incentive for triggering a chain reaction, furthering the cause of human rights.
In this way, PIL could be a driving force. And a focus on PIL may sometimes cause
people to be more alert to potential dynamics that are by no means conducive to
promoting human rights, and warn them against counterproductive effects of specific
PIL rules as well as against the counterproductive effects of specific rules on PIL rules.
Let me be more concrete now: anyone who tries to define the role of PIL in the
Refgov project will soon tend to distinguish three functions, even if, on closer inspec-
tion, these functions are closely connected with each other.
A PIL as a Likely ‘Target’ When Debating the Outcomes of the Use of OMC:
A Reason to Anticipate this Outcome and to Include PIL Aspects in the Refgov
Project from the Beginning
First and foremost, PIL may be regarded as a rather evident target of the outcome of
the Refgov project, in the sense that it is quite conceivable that in due course, during or
at the end of the Refgov project, suggestions will be defined in relation to the issue of
PIL regulations, PIL directives, the inclusion or clarification of PIL rules in certain
areas, or in relation to the manner in which the Court of Justice can best exercise a
check on national PIL legislation, or in relation to the approximation of PIL rules by
the European Member States themselves.
In other words, one of the Refgov project ‘outcomes’ will probably be that PIL is to
be designated as one of the ‘target’ disciplines. If this point is recognised, it is valid to
argue that it would be fertile and efficient to anticipate this outcome by focusing
attention on PIL issues right from the beginning. I will explain this in further detail
below.
a) OMC will Sooner or Later Appeal to PIL
i) Point of Departure: About the Functions of OMC
When we try to relate PIL to the Refgov project in this respect, a quotation taken from
De Schutter may serve as a point of departure, because the latter discusses the functions
of the OMC and argues in this context3 that one of its functions could be the following:
3 O. De Schutter, The Implementation of the EU Charter of Human rights through the Open Method of
Coordination, JeanMonnet Working Paper 2004 07/04, at 2, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.
org/papers/papers04.htlm.
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In fields where the competences are shared between theMember States and the Union, the OpenMethod
of Coordination may be seen as a searching mechanism “to identify where an initiative of the Union may
be required because of the externalities”, both positive and negative, which the action of each Member
State produces on all the other States, with which they share a common area of freedom, security and
justice, and area in which, in particular, the free movement of persons and the free provision of services
are guaranteed and in which competition is to be free and undistorted.
Accordingly, if we keep this observation by De Schutter in the back of our minds, in
particular where he refers to ‘externalities’, it is quite evident that the Refgov project
will sooner or later rely on PIL.
ii) Two Reasons why PIL is a likely Target
As a matter of fact, it is quite straightforward that PIL should be one of the ‘targets’,
and there are two reasons for that.
First, PIL has traditionally been the very discipline ‘dealing with externalities in
issues of private law’. The existence of ‘externalities’ is indeed one of the prerequisites
to PIL. PIL seeks to regulate the externalities by issuing rules concerning jurisdiction,
applicable law, recognition and enforcement. And in regulating ‘externalities’ in this
way, PIL is inevitably confronted with human rights—and, in a broader sense, with
concerns relating to the protection of weak parties, etc. In short, PIL provides a way
of dealing with externalities, including the confrontation with human rights issues. In
this context, it should be underlined, however, that PIL is essentially national law.
Admittedly, there are areas where supranational sources are available, and these are
sometimes even European sources. But some other areas are still regulated purely at
the national level. It is also conceivable that even though supranational PIL rules are
available, the latter are not applicable in all EUMember States. ‘Problems’ could arise
either because of the contents of the PIL rules or because PIL rules are sometimes
national-level rules, as stated above, which is emphasised to an increasing extent at this
juncture: this is said to be the case mainly where PIL rules themselves do not satisfy the
requirements occasioned by internal market considerations, or where people within the
European area are confronted with problems because countries use different PIL rules,
because they do not apply the same legal rules, or because they use different standards
when it comes to recognising decisions taken elsewhere, such that people lose rights or
are confronted with legal uncertainty if they move to another country; harmonisation
could well improve the extent to which rules are predictable and strengthen mutual
trust. For this reason, the Refgov project may, sooner or later, address the contents of
PIL rules and differences between PIL rules of various countries, which pose ‘problems’
for citizens. In that event, the Refgov project may address the extent to which it is
desirable in an EU context to harmonise the various ways in which the ‘externalities’
are regulated in a well-defined manner.
At the same time, the foregoing brings us to the second reason why it is to be
expected that PIL issues could become a Refgov project target. As a result of the entry
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, PIL, or at least parts of it, has been ‘commu-
nitarised’. PIL is linked directly with the idea and the project of the creation of an
internal market and an area of freedom, security and justice, the fundamental freedoms
and the non-discrimination principle, and under the terms of this movement, far-
reaching powers have been conferred on the European institutions. This means that
European institutions already have the powers to take action in the field of PIL as the
occasion arises, including the power to issue PIL regulations. Is it possible to contend
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for this reason that, where De Schutter4 discusses the ‘legal basis’, the legal basis that
has already been created for PIL intervention may perhaps come in useful? It should
not be forgotten that the Europeanisation of PIL, which manifested itself in the Treaty
of Amsterdam, has made the minds ‘ready’ and prepared to coordinate PIL rules at the
European level, and this possibility has already been widely used.
In short, Europe is already interfering with PIL through the process of Europeani-
sation of PIL, albeit not specifically from the perspective of human rights promotion
within Europe, but from the perspective of the promotion of the internal market—as a
result of the attempts to encourage legal certainty and to remove obstacles perceived in
an internal market—realising the instrumental function PIL may play in achieving an
internal market.
This communitarisation phenomenon has triggered sensational developments in the
field of PIL, both in terms of procedure and in terms of substance: several European
PIL regulations have already been issued and several regulations are in the process of
drafting at this very juncture, certainly in areas where European institutions have
traditionally exercised restraint, in particular the field of international family law. In
addition, the Court of Justice has undauntedly started to intervene in national PIL
issues in quite a drastic manner. PIL lawyers are engaged in a debate5 on whether—and
if so, how precisely—PIL should change as a result of European incentives.
iii) The Current Situation: PIL is in an Interplay of Forces
At this juncture, PIL is in an area of tension: on the one hand, PIL had already been the
subject of instrumentalisation tendencies in the past few years, but, on the other hand,
PIL is now increasingly focused on instrumentalisation attempts for European
purposes, and all this has resulted in a battle of sometimes contradictory forces. I will
explain these forces briefly.6
The point of departure in respect of the first force is that PIL had already been
‘instrumentalised’ in previous years in various ways. Accordingly, the impact of politi-
cal policy considerations on PIL has manifested itself in recent years such that in
various domains there is by no means ‘neutral’ PIL, still based on the equality of legal
systems, but that, on the contrary, PIL rules have been issued in a manner that is
conducive to well-defined policy targets. Examples include concerns for the ‘protection
of the weak party’—see, for example, the rules concerning the applicable law relating to
consumer contracts, employment contracts, etc, or concerns about ‘supporting’ a sub-
stantive law result, such as supporting the result of the possibility of marriage (known
as ‘favor matrimonii’ in PIL) or supporting the possibility of divorce (known as ‘favor
4 Here and below, quoting De Schutter, I refer to the orginal draft of his contributions to the project (mainly
his contribution ‘Monitoring Human Rights in the Union as a Learning Process’), as well as to his
publication mentioned in n 3 supra.
5 It should be emphasised, however, that there were already discussions about the relationship between PIL
and European law before the Treaty of Amsterdam, both from the perspective of the four freedoms and
from the perspective of the non-discrimination principle, and that the Court of Justice, for example, had
already intervened in matters such as the cautio judicatum solvi.
6 In the extensive version of this article (available in its original version at http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be
under ‘Publications’, ‘Fundamental Rights’, ‘FR4’, and to be published in a slightly revised version in
Fundamental Rights and the EU—In the Web of Governance (Bruylant, 2007), I have made a first attempt
to position—in a fragmentary way—the convergence or tension between ‘old’ (‘classic’) and ‘new’
(European) tendencies to instrumentalise PIL and its interaction with human rights. The extensive version
of this article also includes more discussions and footnotes.
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divortii’ in PIL) or supporting the possibility of acquiring maintenance payments. In
this context, reference may be made, for example, to developments in international tort
law, where there has been an evolution from a focus on the tortfeasor and the place
where the wrongful act was committed to more attention for the victim and the place
where damage was sustained, certainly partly as a result of political developments,
and where there have been pleas for using PIL to make a fitting contribution in the
battle against international environmental pollution.7 As a matter of fact, the phrase
‘making a contribution’ was quite recently used in Dutch PIL in the context of the
tendency to use PIL for the purpose of combating terrorists.8 Where the literature uses
the phrase ‘PIL pollution’9 in analyses of PIL rules concerning environmental pollution
liability, the question arises whether we are really facing PIL pollution in this context.
I refer to other tendencies I described myself as ‘PIL pollution’, especially in relation to
Dutch PIL, in various publications in the past, namely using PIL for the purposes of
restrictive migration policies and, in a more general sense, for the purpose of restricting
public-law rights (rights based on aliens law, social security law and nationality law) of
third-country nationals in the Netherlands.10
Apparently, the ‘importance’ of PIL is on the increase, but it seems that people
sometimes recognise this importance as a result of their conviction that PIL may be
conducive to achieving political targets that are basically associated with other fields.
Attempts are then made to ‘model’ PIL on this basis. In other words, even though the
importance of PIL is now recognised, this could, paradoxically, trigger tendencies to
absorb, incorporate or, at the very least, model PIL from the perspective of other fields
or political objectives in these fields.
No matter how one appreciates—in a positive or negative sense—any specific
manner of instrumentalisation within or of PIL, instrumentalisation attempts or ten-
dencies have occasionally led to a kind of ‘acquis’. Sometimes these instrumentalisation
tendencies are reflected in specific PIL rules issued at the European level, in which case,
this concerns a kind of ‘acquis communautaire’—see, for example, the rules concerning
jurisdiction in contracts of employment, as included in the Brussels Convention,11 and
the rules concerning applicable law in contracts of employment, as included in the
Rome Convention.12 In these situations, there could be said to be a kind of acquis
communautaire, albeit, with possible variations, at the national level.13 Sometimes, PIL
7 See, e.g., for the Netherlands S. J. Schaafsma, Vervuiling in het conflictenrecht: een onderzoek naar
theoretische concepten in praktijk van de internationale milieuvervuiling onrechtmatige daad in het interna-
tional privaatrechtelijke conflictenrecht [Pollution in Conflict of Laws] (Post Scriptum Reeks, 1994).
8 See P. Vlas, ‘Terrorisme en IPR’ [‘Terrorism and PIL’], [2005] Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en
Registratie 663.
9 See Schaafsma, n 7 supra.
10 In these analyses, I have pointed out several times that the ‘instrumentalisation’ of PIL for the purpose of
encouraging mobility of persons (which Europe is currently trying to achieve in the context of international
family law) is much more in line with the essence of PIL and modern PIL, which is essentially, even if only
in part, focused on facilitating legal transactions and the target of international harmonisation, certainly
now that Europe takes ‘favor’ tendencies to heart.
11 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
27 September 1968, [1990] OJ C189/2 (consolidated version published in 1998 ([1998] OJ C27/1) (the
Brussels Convention).
12 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [1998] OJ C27/34, opened for signature in
Rome on 19 June 1980 (the Rome Convention).
13 On this subject, see also A. A. H. Van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers; een onderzoek naar
de interactie tussen arbeidsrecht, EG-recht en IPR aan de hand van de Detacheringsrichtlijn [International
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rules incorporating any manifestation of instrumentalisation for political reasons are
not unified—or the supranational sources reflecting these policy considerations are
applicable only in specific European Member States. Naturally, even if there is no
unification, it is conceivable that each of the European Member States have incorpo-
rated political policy considerations into their national PIL to the same or a different
extent. For example, several countries have embraced the principle of ‘favor divortii’—
supporting the possibility of divorce—but in different degrees and in a variety of ways.
All this may well result in what I could describe as ‘modern PIL’, although it should be
borne in mind that this ‘modern PIL’ may well vary from country to country, and it
may or may not have been given substance at the European level.
It turns out now—and this brings me to the second force I pinpointed above—that
recently PIL has become increasingly focused on instrumentalisation tendencies
inspired by ‘European policy considerations’, in particular since the Treaty of
Amsterdam. In other words, attempts are being made to use PIL as a tool in achieving
European targets. This has resulted in ‘pressure’ being exerted on ‘modern’ PIL—of
European or national origin—as instrumentalised at an earlier stage.
Occasionally, these ‘old’ and ‘new’ PIL incentives match each other well but, at other
times, they are in conflict: sometimes the Europeanisation of PIL does not involve any
fundamental changes—see, for example, the conversion of the Convention on the
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the
Brussels Convention) into a Council Regulation to the same effect (the Brussels Regu-
lation),14 which did not encroach essentially on the principle of the protection of the
weak party, which had been enshrined in the Convention—but sometimes there are
fierce debates on the manner in which the existing PIL regime can or cannot be
adjusted—examples include the debate on the implications of the country-of-origin
principle in the original Proposal for a Directive on Services15 for the Rome I proposal16
and the Rome II proposal17, the discussion about the impact of the country-of-origin
principle in the E-Commerce Directive18 and the original version of the Directive on
unfair commercial practices,19 and the debate on the Proposal Rome II itself.
Mobility of Employees; A Study into the Interaction between Labour Law, EC Law and PIL on the Basis of
the Posting Workers Directive] (Sdu Uitgevers, 2000), at 103–104 and M. S. Houwerzijl, De Detacherings-
richtlijn [Directive on Posting of Workers] (Kluwer, 2005), at 4.
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1.
15 Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market COM (2004) 2def/2 (13 January 2004).
16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to contrac-
tual obligations (‘Rome I’) COM (2005) 650 final (15 December 2005).
17 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (‘Rome II’) COM (2003) 427 (01) (22 July 2003). Amended Proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations
(‘Rome II’) COM (2006) 83 final (21 February 2006).
18 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market [2000] OJ
L178/1 (E-Commerce Directive).
19 COM (2003) 356 def (namely Art 4, para 1) and COM (2004) 753 def. Directive 2005/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer com-
mercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7 EC,
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC)
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2005] OJ L149/22 (Directive on Unfair
Commercial Practices).
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iv) Ambition: Instrumentalisation of PIL from the Perspective of Human Rights
Promotion within the Union?
So what is the relevance of these dynamics and debates for the Refgov project, one may
well ask? This may be apparent where we address the question of what position should
be taken in this debate by those who are concerned about the ‘promotion of human
rights’. The following ambition could be defined: how should we evaluate or develop
PIL rules in various legal domains that are the most effective tools for the purposes of
the instrumentalisation of PIL from the perspective of promoting the protection of human
rights within the Union?
In short, if it is true that there are tendencies to instrumentalise PIL for European
purposes, and if it is true that there are debates about how to develop PIL in the future,
should we then not seize the opportunity to analyse at the same time how PIL is to be
instrumentalised such that it is most conducive to the objective of human rights
promotion? Or, to put it differently, if there is instrumentalisation of PIL anyway,
would it not be a good idea to try and promote a type of instrumentalisation that also
fosters human rights at the same time—or, at the very least, that does not impede the
promotion of human rights?
Even if the Refgov project conclusion would be that using OMC as a method in the
human rights domain is not realistic and fertile, the results of a study as meant above
could be useful in the context of the discussion about PIL issues and their relationship
with human rights.
Conceivably, OMC could be relevant as a method of promoting human rights in this
context in a variety of ways. One hypothesis might be, for example, that OMC could
help to create PIL rules (at the European level or Member State level—eventually
controlled by the Court of Justice) in a way that encourages the protection of human
rights within Europe. Where De Schutter wrote about the function of OMC to define
areas of intervention, it is also possible to argue that, where such areas have already
been defined, OMC could be used to identify the manner in which action is to be
taken—in particular, in areas like PIL. Hence, PIL lawyers might assume the task of
heeding the results of the use of the OMC method.
Viewed from this perspective, PIL would be relevant only at the end of the Refgov
project. But it might be better to address PIL issues before that: the task would then be
to devote systematic attention to PIL issues during the Refgov project, including the
manner in which PIL rules (supranational, European or national, and covering juris-
diction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement) regulate ‘externalities’ at the
present moment. For example, the Refgov project might examine the manner in which
the various European Member States have dealt with PIL issues, look into what the
Member States can learn from each other and how European institutions can learn
from the experiences of Member States if they intend to issue PIL rules: what are the
‘best practices’? Another possibility is to examine and evaluate the way in which PIL
problems are now being solved and whether or not PIL issues are being unified, and the
extent to which these are conducive to ‘promoting human rights’, taking account of the
factor of ‘feasibility’ at the highest level. All this could be carried out with respect to
domains such as international family law, international labour law, international tort
law, etc, where human rights issues are relevant—or, in a broader sense, wherever
concerns such as the ‘protection of the weak party’, ‘family life protection’, etc are
relevant.
The following provisional conclusion can be drawn in respect of the first role that
could be played by PIL in the Refgov project: in this context, it is the impact of human
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rights on PIL and the impact of the Refgov project outcome in terms of its human
rights promotion target on PIL, which, for its part, regulates ‘externalities’, that will
perhaps be of particular importance. At this juncture, the crucial decision in this
context would be whether the likelihood that the Refgov project will sooner or later
affect PIL constitutes a reason for anticipating PIL issues, taking account of current
debates, opposition, sensitivity, etc concerning PIL, and, in this way, to think about
suggestions relating to what PIL rules could already be ‘appropriate’ at this stage. In
my opinion, this question should be answered in the affirmative.
b) Another Ambition Should be to Examine how Certain Initiatives outside PIL
Would Affect PIL
Because PIL regulates aspects of ‘externalities’, it is useful to examine the implications
for PIL if using OMC yields a suggestion of some kind of coordination or action. This
will reveal—still within the context of the first role to be played by PIL in the Refgov
project—the extent to which PIL debates could be taken into account in a more indirect
manner as well, in particular by focusing attention on the impact of any initiatives and
proposals outside PIL on PIL. This concerns the ambition to define and evaluate the
manner in which ‘solutions’ and proposals invented outside the realm of PIL and put
forward to foster European integration and, perhaps in part, to promote human rights
could, for their part, have an impact on PIL rules, and to evaluate these dynamics.
i) Substantive Law Harmonisation
This could include interactions between developments relating to the harmonisation of
substantive law, on the one hand, and PIL developments, on the other—where PIL is
to be taken as including ‘internationally mandatory rules’. First and foremost, it is
worth mentioning that PIL is sometimes regarded as a way to bridge differences
between various legal systems without unifying the latter, in which context PIL is
claimed to be a substitute for the harmonisation of substantive law. In addition, it is
often claimed that PIL follows naturally from the unification of substantive law,
because it is considered necessary to achieve a specified minimum level of substantive
law consensus before starting to apply—flexible—PIL rules. Does mutual recognition
in this sense also assume a specified degree of harmonisation of substantive law, or does
the very concept of mutual recognition allow quite essential differences to continue to
exist? In short, the relationship between PIL and substantive law seems to be quite
dialectic in nature and may perhaps necessitate a broader analysis. Below, I will
pinpoint a number of specific issues that merit further attention.
Implications for issues of ‘internationally mandatory rules’. A first point that merits
attention in studying the interaction between harmonisation of substantive law and
PIL could be the following: what would be the effects of the harmonisation of sub-
stantive law on specific PIL domains? This should cover not only the obvious changes
in rules in the areas of recognition and enforcement and applicable law but also the
implications in respect of ‘internationally mandatory rules’—rules that are deemed to
be applicable in specific international legal relationships, irrespective of the applicable
law that customarily governs this legal relationship. This focus on internationally
mandatory rules may raise questions in respect of the following: would the harmoni-
sation of substantive law in some way or other (for example in relation to the type of
harmonisation: minimum or complete harmonisation; in relation to the rationale of
harmonisation: harmonisation intended to remove internal market obstacles and/or
intended to create a minimum protection level for specific persons) have an impact on
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the possibility or the obligation of using well-defined rules as internationally manda-
tory rules, and, if this is the case, would this be regrettable? In this context, I refer to
international labour law studies and to some observations made in a recent Belgian
study on non-discrimination law, in particular relating to the impact of the Directive on
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,20 on the status
of national anti-discrimination legislation in an international context,21 in particular
concerning the possibility of invoking such legislation as internationally mandatory
rules within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations. According to Traest, it is possible to argue that once the
Directive has come into force in the Member States, national anti-discrimination law
cannot be used anymore as internationally mandatory rules. Yet, in his view, anti-
discrimination law could still function as a ‘loi d’ordre police’. Would it be useful, one
wonders, to evaluate from this perspective in what cases it is appropriate to have the
possibility of invoking well-defined rules as internationally mandatory rules—and
could this evaluation allow us to argue in favour of the unification of substantive law
or a specific area thereof? If the conclusion is drawn, for example, that only minimum-
level harmonisation is feasible, and that this would entail the creation of unwanted
restrictions when it comes to the possibility of invoking specific rules as internationally
mandatory rules, would this lead to the decision that it is better not to opt for
harmonisation?22
Problems raised in the Ingmar case: the scope of harmonised law and its effects on party
autonomy. A second issue that merits attention could be the manner in which the
international scope of legislation that includes unified or harmonised substantive law is
to be defined. This question has become particularly pregnant in PIL in the light of the
Court of Justice’s Ingmar decision.23 In this case, the Court of Justice faced the legal
position of an internationally operating agent. The parties had agreed on the applica-
tion of the law of a non-European legal system—namely the law of the USA—but the
question arose whether European unified rules that provide for specific rights for
commercial agents after the termination of their agency agreement could be set aside by
this choice of law. These unified rules had been codified in the European Directive on
Agency, which is partly24 intended to protect the agent, as a ‘weak party’. In this case,
where the agent performed his activities in the United Kingdom, the principal was
established in a non-Member State (namely the USA), and where a clause in the
contract stipulated that the contract was governed by the law of that third country, the
Court of Justice held that Articles 17 and 18 of the Directive had to be applied, even
20 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22.
21 See, e.g., M. Traest, ‘Enkele overwegingen over de toepasselijkheid van de wet ter bestrijding van dis-
criminatie in internationale (arbeids)verhoudingen’ [’Some Considerations about the Applicability of the
Anti-Discriminationl Act in International Labour Relationships’] in D. Cuypers (ed.), Gelijkheid in het
arbeidsrecht. Gelijkheid zonder grenzen? [Equality in Labour Law. Equality without Limits?] (Intersentia,
2003), 80.
22 See also, on the issue of harmonisation, the Communications and the Action Plan on European Contract
law, and see also the project European Labour Law Network, available at http://www.elln.eu, an EU-wide
network of labour law academics.
23 ECJ Case C-381/98, Ingmar [2000] ECR I-9305.
24 See also, on the aim of stimulating a fair competition within the internal market, and the implications
of focusing on either this aim (considered by de Boer as the aim of protecting a ‘public interest’), or
the aim of protecting the agent (considered by de Boer as the aim of protecting an ‘individual interest’),
Th. M. De Boer, ‘Comments with Ingmar’, [2005] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 332.
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though the parties had chosen US law as the applicable law, and the court was of the
opinion that these rules could be regarded more or less as internationally mandatory
rules. But this Ingmar decision is still quite controversial—for example in terms of
its implications for the assessment of the legal position of internationally operating
employees—and, in a more general sense, in terms of the question of how the interna-
tional scope of unified European substantive law is to be defined if the legislation itself
is not transparent in this respect. This problem shows how well it is possible to argue
that it is necessary to unify substantive law for the purpose of removing internal market
obstacles and/or for the purpose of protecting the weak party, but that the question of
the international scope of this legislation, and the impact on the parties’ choice of law
options,25 etc, may still arise. This raises the question under what circumstances it is
desirable that the parties’ possibility of making a choice of law, as in the Ingmar case,
should be ‘affected’. This means that it is necessary to evaluate whether a specific type
of unification of substantive law should be accompanied by the definition of the
international scope of these substantive law provisions and, conversely, of the extent to
which, even if the unification of PIL rules is achieved, in particular where agreement is
reached on the choice of law options, such choice of law may be overridden by the
applicability of harmonised substantive law. Because even in the case of the unification
of applicable law and in the case of the unification of the choice of law option, it turns
out that problems may arise in connection with the relationship with unified substan-
tive law.
ii) Introduction and Proliferation of the Country-of-Origin Principle—
Mutual Recognition
When it comes to initiatives outside the field of PIL having an effect on PIL, another
issue is undoubtedly the discussion about the implications of the country-of-origin
principle on PIL. Naturally, I also refer in this context to the debates on the original
proposal of a Directive on Services, debates on the introduction of this principle in the
E-Commerce Directive, or in the Directive on Unfair Business Practices,26 etc. As De
Schutter and Francq27 explain in a recent article, the introduction of this ‘home country
principle’ could have (had) serious effects on PIL, and, accordingly, on the protection
of internationally mobile employees. Applicable law rules would come under pressure,
and the Directive on Posting of Workers28 could perhaps be transformed from a model
based on minimum protection for cross-border posting of employees towards a model
based onmaximum protection. In a more general sense, ‘regulatory competition’ would
be stimulated in this way. In PIL, fierce debates are currently being conducted about
the significance of the country-of-origin principle; which also turn out to be relevant to
the Refgov project, because the proliferation of this principle in private law may have
far-reaching effects, for example on the manner in which traditionally weak parties are
protected in international situations.
25 As permitted currently, for example, in Art 3 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations.
26 See above for references to these (proposals for) Directives.
27 O. De Schutter and S. Francq, ‘La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le marché intérieur:
reconnaissance mutuelle, harmonisation et conflits de lois dans l’Europe élargie’ (2005) 5–6 Cahiers de
droit européen 603.
28 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the
Posting of Workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] OJ L18/1.
January 2008 Promoting Human Rights within the Union
© 2008 The Author 115
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
B Introduction/Maintenance of a Specific Type of PIL Rules as one of the
‘Conditions of Success’ and ‘Flanking Measures’ of the Refgov Project?
a) Introduction: Some Observations about OMC
Above, it was argued that OMC may possibly help to define better PIL rules or better
ways of taking account of PIL rules—and that thinking about and working with OMC
should be accompanied by a study of PIL issues. But, as one may suggest, can there not
be interaction in the opposite direction as well? Could PIL perhaps somehow support
OMC as well? Is it a good idea to connect the use of OMC with the promotion of
specific kinds of PIL rules? Can PIL function as the driving force behind the promotion
of human rights?
This idea is inspired by De Schutter where he writes about the ‘conditions of success’
and ‘flanking measures’ of OMC. The hypothesis would then be that the inclusion
of specific PIL rules may be regarded as one of the conditions of success of OMC.
So this is a second possibility where PIL could be relevant to the Refgov project—
and, hence, a second possible role to be played by PIL in the Refgov project. This role
may become clearer if one considers the impact of PIL itself on the promotion of
human rights, which is connected with the idea that PIL may ultimately help to
promote human rights. Earlier, De Schutter referred to the ‘conditions of success’ and
‘flanking measures’ of OMC and it is quite possible to conceive that PIL could be one
of these conditions of success or ‘flanking measures’ of OMC, because it is quite certain
that where specific conditions have been satisfied, PIL may well be regarded as a
catalyst in promoting human rights in Europe; indeed, if certain conditions have been
satisfied, PIL may even be regarded as a catalyst in the promotion and flourishing of
OMC, ultimately resulting in the promotion of human rights across Europe. Below I
will briefly explain a number of potential approaches in this context: how exactly could
PIL promote human rights in Europe?
Some of what will be addressed below could also be considered in the light of De
Schutter’s observations about maximising:
the benefits of regulatory competition between the horizontal units, while limiting the risk of a race to
the bottom in the field of human rights . . . identify situations where the Union should exercise its
powers to protect and promote human rights, while organising the competition between the Union and
the Member States through a renewed understanding of the principle of subsidiarity. At both levels,
forms of co-ordination between the units concerned (the Member States and the Union) should be
invented.
The question arises whether a form of PIL coordination could possibly be this form of
coordination. For example, is the organisation of a flexible system of mutual recogni-
tion (where it is legitimate to represent ‘recognition’ as a PIL principle) a form of
coordination that can promote human rights? In this context, it is appropriate to refer
immediately to the debates about the Directive on Services, which was criticised heavily
because the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ enshrined in it would, in all likelihood, be
anything but conducive to the protection of employees—and this criticism was also
expressed by the PIL discipline, because PIL achievements (and proposals for the
‘Europeanisation’ of PIL, above all proposals for a Rome I and a Rome II regulation)
could be put aside. On the other hand, it is fitting to point out the potentially ‘uplifting’
movement that could be the result of an obligation to recognise a same-sex marriage
solemnised in a Member State.
The passage below should also be viewed in light of De Schutter’s observations
about:
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two elements . . . lacking in the current system. First, there exists no screening mechanism which would
identify, on a systematic basis, where some form of coordination between the Member States—or even
some form of legislative action at the federal level—might be required, in order to ensure that, left to
themselves, the dynamics of the internal market or of the area of freedom, security and justice, will not
lead to a lowering of the level of protection of human rights. Second, there is no mechanism for collective
learning between the Member States, despite the usefulness of such a device, if it is properly imagined.
Elsewhere, De Schutter29 describes one of the functions of OMC as follows:
. . . the open method of coordination could be seen as an encouragement to mutual learning, as the
solution preferred in certain Member States may inspire the adoption of similar solutions in other
Member States, especially where such replication avoids the risk that the implementation of human
rights at the level of each State recreate obstacles within the internal market or impede the cooperation
between the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice.
De Schutter and Deakin30 define the following hypothesis: ‘Thus our hypothesis is that
central among the conditions of success of OMC and related processes are mechanisms
which function as incentives for the actors to reflect upon the extent to which their
understanding of the problem which is to be overcome and their own position may be
context-dependent, and therefore may be open to revision in the light of experience . . .’
and he goes on to say that ‘certain institutional frameworks facilitate reflexivity, while
others discourage it’. To what extent can PIL be useful? To what extent can PIL be this
kind of ‘incentive’ and to what extent can PIL promote ‘reflection’, etc? To what extent
can PIL act as a catalyst and driving force in promoting human rights, in the knowledge
that issues such as ‘availability’ are often relevant in the context of human rights and
PIL has a contribution to make when it comes to issues such as ‘availability’ and
‘transferability’.31
b) Attention for PIL Rules which could ‘Promote’ Human Rights
i) PIL Rules may Create Domino Effects
PIL could act as a driving force in promoting human rights, as suggested above. One
possible approach in this context would be a focus on the domino effects that could be
created by means of PIL rules, for example when it comes to the effects of the impo-
sition of an obligation on Member States to recognise concepts created elsewhere: this
could be perceived as a kind of injection given to a legal system by means of PIL rules,
an incentive to develop in a well-defined direction. To substantiate this point, reference
can be made to current developments in European international divorce law: as a result
of the issue of flexible rules concerning the recognition of international divorces in the
‘Brussels II’ Regulation,32 as well as in the ‘Brussels II bis’ Regulation,33 in which the
‘favor divortii principle’ has been incorporated, it turns out that European incentives
are offered in the direction of a more general tendency to liberalise international
divorce law and perhaps even substantive divorce law. There is room for arguments
29 De Schutter, n 3 supra, at 3.
30 De Schutter and Deakin, n 2 supra, at 3.
31 On this subject, see also infra section II.C.
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both
spouses [2000] OJ L160/19.
33 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1.
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with respect to the necessity to make further progress towards the liberalisation of
divorce law once divorces obtained under flexible conditions elsewhere have been
recognised. It seems logical to argue that anything that is ‘available’ elsewhere and that
is ‘transferable’ to the country of origin should also be made ‘available’ in that country
itself—first of all by means of flexible rules concerning jurisdiction and applicable law,
and subsequently perhaps for those whose legal relationship manifests itself only in an
internal context (because if they are refused access to such ‘rights’, there would be a
situation of reverse discrimination). It is conceivable that these arguments are advanced
even if they are not necessarily successful. The awareness and appreciation of these
arguments and dynamics may both encourage people to create liberal recognition
rules and discourage them from doing so. Principles that are to be taken account of in
this context include the principles of non-discrimination, fraud prevention, respect for
cultural values in a society, etc. However this may be, divorce law does seem to be
undergoing an evolution at the moment, ranging from recognition rules to jurisdiction
and applicable law rules, and this may ultimately result—as some people hope and
others fear—in an evolution of the substantive divorce law of theMember States whose
divorce law is currently not yet as liberal as that of other Member States. In this way,
PIL may give rise to a kind of ‘backwards progression’. This is precisely what some
people are hoping for and that others are fearing, if European divorce recognition rules
are introduced or if European recognition rules concerning same-sex marriages were to
be introduced—or if the European Court of Justice were to intervene along these lines
in national PIL, in particular by forcing a Member State to recognise a same-sex
marriage created elsewhere. After all, if a Member State has not introduced the concept
of the same-sex marriage in its legal system, it is conceivable that this Member State,
perhaps under pressure from the Court of Justice, may recognise a same-sex marriage
concluded elsewhere, perhaps even in the hypothetical case that it concerns two of its
own citizens. It is conceivable that the Court of Justice could compel this Member State
to recognise the same-sex marriage—more or less by analogy with the Grunkin case.34
This reference to the Grunkin case brings us to a point that merits attention. In the
Opinion in respect of the Grunkin case, reference was made to human rights principles.
The question arises whether it is desirable and sufficient to impose European PIL rules
only and exclusively where there are purely human rights issues—rights that are cur-
rently recognised as such—or can and should European interference extend further, in
a process of liberalisation of international family law, in particular in areas where
human rights are not discussed as yet. At this juncture, Europe is interfering with
international divorce law in a far-reaching manner, but has not yet intervened in issues
involving same-sex marriages. If European PIL rules in this field were to be issued,
‘injections’ and incentives of some sort would be given to the Member States.
ii) Stimulating Reflection on the Differences between Legal Systems: Becoming
Familiar with Foreign Rules through PIL
A second way of considering PIL as a potential catalyst in promoting human rights can
be defined as follows: it is possible to argue, for example, that once Member States are
forced under certain circumstances to recognise concepts that have been achieved
34 Case C-96/04, Grunkin. The Opinion dates from 30 June 2005. The judgment dates from 27 April 2006. The
judgment has fizzled out: the Court of Justice stated that ‘The Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities has no jurisdiction to answer the question referred by the Amtsgericht Niebüll in its decision of
2 June 2003’.
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elsewhere, this could encourage them in ‘collective learning’.35 In this way, PIL may
well be considered a manner of making the Member States’ confrontation with one
another’s legal systems inevitable. PIL could offer possibilities of becoming familiar
with one another’s legal systems and use this as a basis for evaluating the best
‘solution’.
PIL could then stimulate OMC, in the sense that the confrontation with other legal
systems and with ‘solutions’ in these other legal systems—through the obligation of
recognising the achievements of these other legal systems—could contribute towards
the promotion of reflecting on a country’s own legal system and towards a balanced
choice in favour of ‘best practices’.
iii) Harmonisation of Internationally Mandatory Rules under Specific Conditions?
If one reflects on the manner in which the introduction of specific PIL rules could be
conducive to achieving the objective of human rights promotion, one should by no
means focus only on the ‘classical’ PIL rules of jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition
and enforcement. The significance and potential of internationally mandatory rules, as
they exist and are handled in PIL, should be taken into account as well. One question
that needs to be addressed is whether OMC should be supported by the introduction or
enforcement of internationally mandatory rules, if necessary, in a unified form, as has
happened, for example, in the Directive on Posting of Workers. Because this Directive
may well be considered a model of European unification of internationally mandatory
rules in the domain of international labour law, as far as the cross-border posting of
employees is concerned, conceivably, it may be argued that it is necessary to be able to
use these rules as minimum standards in every respect—I refer to what was stated
above36 about the impact of the original proposal for a Directive on Services on this
Directive, especially when it comes to the conversion of this Directive from a minimum
standard to a maximum standard. Incidentally, the development—or at the very least
the enforcement—of specific rules as internationally mandatory rules and the evalua-
tion about whether these are to be used as minimum standards could relate not only to
domains such as international labour law, as interwoven with social security rights.
This could also be considered, for example, with respect to non-discrimination legisla-
tion as such. In this context, I refer to analyses that have already been undertaken into
the status of equal treatment legislation in international situations, which have
addressed the concrete question of whether these rules may be applicable as rules of
normally applicable law in the area of international tort law or international contract
law, as ‘loi de police’ or as internationally mandatory rules.37
iv) Using Specific PIL Rules in Defining Certain ‘Terms’ in Community Legislation
PIL could act as a driving force in yet another way, namely by giving ‘substance’ to
specific concepts used in European legislation in a well-defined manner. This could
concern, for example, family-law concepts such as those used in European migration
Directives. For example, the Commission already argued during the preparation of the
35 PIL lawyers often already try to use differences between the legal systems in a strategic way—eg in the
frame of Art 6 of the Rome Convention. See also in this context the information published on the website
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/ejn/ (European Justice Network).
36 See supra section II.A.b).ii).
37 See, in particular, publications by M. Traest and A. A. van Hoek. See also the Directive on Posting of
Workers, n 28 supra, Art 3, para 1(g).
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Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move freely
within the territory of the Member States that it has no jurisdiction to give further
substance to the family-law concepts itself,38 but, on the other hand, the Court of
Justice does have the power to check specific PIL aspects. By giving well-defined
substance to this PIL regulation, it would then be possible to give an injection to the
development of family-law concepts in, for example, European migration law.39
c) Attention for PIL Rules which could Slow Down and Impede Human Rights
Protection and which could Contribute to a Backlash
Reflecting on the potential role of PIL in the Refgov project in this second sense—
namely functioning as a catalyst in promoting human rights and as a hinge—I believe
that, if the conclusion is drawn that PIL can indeed act as a catalyst, it can do so only
if well-defined PIL rules are used and if specific parameters are satisfied. It is also
particularly important to focus attention on any negative effects of the introduction of
these kinds of PIL rules.
i) The Risk that PIL Rules may Serve as an ‘Excuse’ to Stop Further Evolution
More specifically, it should be recognised that PIL rules may also slow down the
promotion of human rights. As such, one should always be alert to any potentially
‘perverse’ and counterproductive effects of PIL. Issues that merit attention include the
extent to which PIL may be used as an ‘excuse mechanism’, an alibi as it were, where
Member States may argue that they definitely—up to a certain point—accept specific
principles, but that they cannot be forced to go further than that. For example, would
it be legitimate to argue that it is sufficient for a Member State to declare that it is
prepared to recognise decisions made or achievements realised elsewhere subject to
certain conditions, but that it need not organise this possibility in the Member State
itself ? ‘Up to that point but not any further’, could that be the consequence? In my
opinion, one should realise at the very least that arguments of this kind will be
advanced, evaluate the chances of such arguments and how regrettable it would be if
the ‘evolution’ would stop at that point: should a situation like that be appreciated as
being sufficient, as the best possible result, possibly as the ‘second best solution’, as in
an international context, at least, people who are mobile and/or have a link with a
foreign legal system are able to get what they want and may even be able to have this
result recognised when they return to their own countries? Then, the final result would
be that specific rights are ‘available’ and possibly even ‘transferable’ for, at least, a
number of people. Or should we always have the ambition to achieve more than that;
and if we have this ambition, to what extent should we expect PIL rules to create a
domino effect, or to what extent should we fear that PIL rules will slow down further
developments? Attempts to find the answer to questions of this kind could help us make
our choice of specific kinds of PIL rules as specific rules aimed at promoting human
rights. PIL analyses, including analyses of earlier experiences, could be helpful in this
respect.
38 See the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States (COM (2003) 199 def), at 3.
39 On this philosophy, see also V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Communitarisation of International Family Law as
seen from a Dutch Perspective: What is New ? A Prospective Analysis’, in A. Nuyts and N. Watté (eds),
International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant, 2005), 509–561.
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ii) Risk of Introducing Principles such as ‘Mutual Recognition’ by Using the
‘Country-of-Origin Principle’ and Present these as PIL Rules
It is quite certain that there are risks in connection with the protection of humans rights
in some domains if principles such as the country-of-origin principle are used and are
even represented as PIL rules. There is the risk that this principle may change existing
PIL rules in a rather drastic manner and involve the obligation of ‘mutual recognition’
without any further conditions or guarantees—for example the preceding harmonisa-
tion and organisation of minimum protection (which, in addition, should not be
allowed to function as a model of maximum protection)—in the substantive law of
Member States or through harmonisation of internationally mandatory rules, or in the
sense of requirements concerning the existence of a ‘genuine’ link before anything
can be recognised, etc. At this point, I once again refer to the discussions about
this principle as enshrined in the original proposal for a Directive on Services, the
E-commerce Directive, the Rome II-proposal, etc.
C Is it Useful to Pay Attention to PIL Issues because PIL can be Considered a
Discipline from which Lessons can be Learned in a more General Way?
PIL analyses could be useful in a broader sense and this brings us to the third potential
role to be played by PIL in the Refgov project: PIL may be considered a discipline that
has long been confronted with aspects of ‘externalities’ and human rights, and has thus
been able to gain wide experience in addressing several issues that are relevant in
discussing the position and development of human rights in Europe.40
For my part, I am not convinced that PIL can immediately provide full and adequate
answers that are convincing for everybody, but I am of the opinion that it is worth
looking into the debates that have been and are still being conducted in PIL circles,
the arguments used in these debates, the importance attached to these insights and
arguments, etc. In this context, it is certainly worth analysing concepts such as the
‘availability’ of rights—both in relation to issues of jurisdiction law, applicable law and
in relation to recognition and enforcement, as well as the concept of ‘transferability’. In
this way, one will probably be confronted with arguments and concepts with respect
to how to avoid class justice, fraud, ‘shopping’, etc, which have already been used in
PIL debates about such issues as divorce and repudiation. Incidentally, the issue of
‘availability’ was also raised in the Casus Cha’are shalom ve tsedek v France case,41 as
explained and discussed by Lawson.42 This matter could now be considered from the
PIL perspective, within the context of the Europeanisation of PIL, in which context,
principles such as ‘liberal access to justice’, ‘no-loss-of-rights’ and the like seem to be
crucial.
40 This could be placed in the context of what De Schutter, n 3 supra, at 3–4, describes as a function of OMC:
‘ . . . the open method of coordination could be an adequate means of better reconciling the requirements
of market (economic) freedoms constitutive of the internal market, with human rights, especially social
rights, which the Member States are bound to protect and implement under their jurisdiction’. Possibly,
PIL could help to find such ‘means of better reconciling’!
41 Cha’are shalom ve tsedek v France, 27 June 2000, European Court of Human Rights.
42 R. Lawson, The Monitoring of Fundamental Rights in the Union as a Contribution to the European Legal
Space (III): the Role of the European Court of Human Rights, contribution to the project, available at
http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be and to be published in Fundamental Rights and the EU—In the Web of
Governance (Bruylant, 2007).
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In amore general sense, the hypothesiswouldbe that it is instructive to analyse debates
about ‘availability’ and ‘transferability’ in PIL, taking account of arguments advanced
and evaluated in ‘classical’ PIL discussions in the past as well as with arguments that are
evaluated at this juncture in the ‘new’ context of the Europeanisation of PIL.
a) ’Transferability’ Issues in PIL Debates
PIL issues concerning ‘transferability’ are basically about the possibilities of ‘importa-
tion’, and sometimes also problems in connection with ‘exportability’. ‘Importability’
issues are raised in the context of recognition and enforcement—one of the three
classical PIL issues.
Exportability issues are relevant when the question arises whether and if so, in what
manner, a Member State should take account of the fact that a legal relationship
created in this Member State may not be recognised in another Member State. If
Member State A takes account of Member State B’s non-recognition of what would be
created in Member State A in an anticipatory manner by simply prohibiting the
creation of such legal relationship, this kind of anticipation may well act as a brake.
Arguments like this were already advanced in Dutch PIL discussions about same-sex
marriages, but were put aside at the end of the day.
In this context, it is fascinating to draw attention to the Dutch statutory provision
laid down in Section 3(2) of the Marriages (Conflict of Laws) Act (Wet Conflictenrecht
Huwelijk), which provides that the solemnisation of a marriage may not be refused on
the ground that, under the law of a state of which one of the future spouses possesses
the nationality, there is an impediment to such solemnisation that is in breach of Dutch
public policy. Accordingly, a foreign impediment to a marriage that is designated as
being in breach of public policy in the Netherlands should not be taken heed of in the
Netherlands, even if this means that a marriage may be created that will not be
recognised in the country where this impediment is in force. It is also fascinating in this
context to draw attention to a German court decision43 that involved a marriage to be
solemnised in Germany between a German divorcee and a Spanish man, where there
was an impediment under Spanish law in respect of divorcees, which meant that a
marriage solemnised despite this impediment abroad could not be recognised either.
The German Constitutional Court involved the fundamental right to marry in its
assessment and permitted the parties to marry in Germany, even though it had been
argued earlier during the proceedings that the parties had to be protected against the
negative effects of a ‘limping marriage’.
Anydebates on this issue are centredon the possibility of using the non-recognisability
in the one Member State of achievements in another Member State as an argument to
withhold rights in that otherMember State. Debates on this issue are also centred on the
question of the extent to which it is relevant in assessing any right whether it concerns a
human right as such.Debates on this issue are also centred on the question of howall this
is to be evaluated in a European context—a context of stimulating the internal market
and the creation of room for freedom, security and justice.
b) ‘Availability’ Issues in PIL Debates
‘Availability’ issues in PIL may be raised in the context of PIL debates concerning
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement. If one considers the PIL
43 Decision of the German Constitutional Court of 4 May 1971 ([1974] Revue Critique de Droit International
Privé 72).
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debates in a ‘European context’, it turns out that these issues are also connected with
the difficulty of the separation of ‘intra-Community’ situations from other situations,
as I will explain under c).
First and foremost, as far as the jurisdiction debate is concerned, it is worth remem-
bering that there were times when people were almost systematically ‘sent back’ to their
‘own’ national institutions if they wanted any right to be upheld. Arguments based on
‘access to justice’ may be advanced against such conduct. In this day and age, it often
happens that institutions of several countries are competent at the same time. Where
litigation in a specific country could yield an advantage in the procedure (for example
in terms of the law to be applied), parties are able to make a strategic choice. Placing
it in a broader context, potential debates on this issue are centred on the assessment of
well-known PIL techniques and ‘solutions’, such as the forum (non) conveniens, the
forum necessitatis, the use of jurisdiction rules such as ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ rules,
attempts to avoid ‘class justice’,44 evaluating the argument that the one court, institu-
tion or country may be in a better position to apply a specific law, that this specific
court, institution or country may have more knowledge and experience in this field and
for this reason people had best be referred to that court, institution or country, etc.
Second, as far as the other procedural PIL question is concerned—the recognition and
enforcement question—this is about the possibility of recognising in country Awhat has
been obtained in country B. Should anything obtained in country B be recognised in
country A if this right or possibility was not ‘available’ in country A itself, one wonders?
And if country A recognises anything in a situation like that, may this willingness to
recognise then be used as an excuse for not recognising this right in the country A itself?
In this context, it is worth remembering the experiences of the possibility or impossibility
of the conclusion of civil marriages in Lebanon, ‘getting’ a divorce abroad by the citizens
of countries where divorce used to be prohibited at the time,45 repudiation in France and
other European countries46—and at this juncture, this is relevant in the context of PIL
rules concerning same-sex marriages. In these discussions, arguments relating to the
significance of ‘fraud’ are advanced, the assessment of the necessity that the parties have
a specific ‘link’ with a legal system, the possibilities and limitations of ‘shopping’ for
parties whose legal relationship is defined in an international context, the fear of creating
a situation that may lead to a ‘race to the court by the strongest party’, etc.
Finally, as far as applicable law is concerned, it is worth remembering the discussions
about the possibilities and limitations in respect of party autonomy that have been held
for a long time now. On the issue of choice of law, see also what was stated above47 in
the context of the Ingmar case—the possibilities parties may have to convert a purely
internal legal relationship into an international legal relationship (for example by using
44 This means that there could be class justice if only people who can afford, time-wise or financially, to travel
to that other country where a right may be recognised under the applicable law may have effective access
to this right.
45 Cf in this context the case of Johnston and Others v Ireland, 18 December 1986, European Court of Human
Rights.
46 With respect to France, see, e.g., the Simitch case-law: Cass (Fr), 6 February 1985, [1985] Revue Critique
de Droit International Privé 369. See on this case-law, e.g., P. Courbe, ‘Le divorce international: premier
bilan d’application de l’article 310 du Code Civil’, [1989–1990] Comité français de droit international privé,
Travaux 123; J. Deprez, ‘Droit internatoinal privé et conflits de civilisations’, (1988) IV Recueil des cours
175 and F. Moneger, ‘Vers la fin des répudiations musulmanes par le juge français?’, [1992] Journal de
Droit International 347.
47 Compare supra section II.A.b).i).
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the choice of law option if this ‘internationalisation’ of the legal relationship could be
advantageous for them).48 The conversion from an internal into an international legal
relationship could be more attractive, for example, if the parties are able to obtain
another—more advantageous—applicable law than the one that normally applies to
their internal legal relationship.49
c) Scope and Characteristics of Community Law—Delimitation of Intra-
Community Cases and the Issue of Reverse Discrimination
As for the dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘international’ cases, problems like those
relevant in the Ingmar case, allegations concerning reverse discrimination, etc, it is
appropriate in this context to refer to the distinction between intra-Community
cases and non-intra-Community cases—where the latter may comprise both ‘purely
national situations’ and international situations that are ‘extra-Community’. In that
case, the discussions about the extent to which differences in approach between
intra-Community and non-intra-Community cases are justified are also relevant.50
At this juncture, there are developments in this area and pregnant questions need to
be addressed.51 Below, I will make some observations about the difficulties and com-
plications in respect of the distinction between internal and international cases, and
between intra-Community cases and other international family law cases. The latter
applies by analogy to some other PIL domains.
In international family law, the Garcia Avello case52 reveals that the sociological
reality of migration—and, consequently, the sociological reality of the underlying PIL
questions—is currently quite diverse.53 This means, for example, that descendants from
mobile EU citizens, who have never migrated themselves, may still possess the nation-
ality of another EU Member State and may subsequently claim rights from an EU
perspective.54 As a matter of fact, the personal exercise of the right of free movement
within Europe does not need to be confined to the mobility stage but may sometimes
result in permanent establishment as well. In addition, the Baldinger case55 shows that
this is sometimes followed by naturalisation in the country to which the person con-
cerned has migrated, which may involve the transition from an ‘internal legal relation-
ship’, through a ‘European legal relationship’ to a ‘foreign internal legal relationship’.
In this kind of situation, the newly acquired legal position could turn out to be more
advantageous or more disadvantageous than that held by the EU citizens in that ‘new
country’—and than that held by the person himself before the migration. Variations
are possible: the originally ‘internal legal relationships’ may also, after first having
become ‘European’, become ‘internal’ again, in particular where the person concerned
48 In this context, see, e.g., Art 3(3) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations.
49 On this issue, see also my remarks about the problems of international environmental pollution and
Art 7 of the Rome II proposal in the full version of this article.
50 Cf the discussions raised by the Inspire case of the Court of Justice (C-167/01, [2003] ECR I-10155).
51 See also Van Den Eeckhout, n 1 supra, especially at 298 and 300–301. I repeat a passage from this
contribution.
52 Case C-148-02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613.
53 In this context, see also the Opinion rendered by Advocate General Geelhoed dated 27 February 2003 in
the Hacene Akrich case (C-109/01, [2003] ECR I-9607).
54 And see, e.g., in this context also the Chen case (C-200/02, [2004] ECR I-9925), concerning a child with and
parents without EU nationality.
55 See the Baldinger decision, C-386/02, [2004] ECR I-8411.
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returns to the country of origin—see also the Singh and Hacene Akrich cases.56 Con-
fronted with situations of this kind, the European legislator has to address questions
relating to the scope of jurisdiction, and relating to the line of action to be adopted if
they want to persist in the idea of stimulating free movement: a case that is not yet
intra-Community or no longer intra-Community, where it is always possible to draw a
distinction between the hypothesis that the case does not have any international ele-
ments anyway, or where it does have international elements, which do not make it into
an intra-Community case, however. To my mind, decisions that extend beyond the
scope of PIL, like the decisions in the Singh and Baldinger cases,57 appear to be highly
relevant in this context, because it is interesting to study the Court of Justice’s consid-
erations in these cases, and subsequently to examine the extent to which the same or
other considerations and concerns should play a role in PIL issues. To what extent
should there be a focus, for example, in PIL issues relating to the free movement of
persons, on the aspect and objective of avoiding limping relationships58—in the light of
the fact that limping legal relationships could pose a problem in cases involving
mobility, and which could slow down mobility—or also, possibly as an independent
issue, the objective of preventing people from losing their rights in the case of
mobility—given the fact that the loss of rights in the case of mobility may well dis-
courage people from exercising their right of free movement in actual practice? This
may, for example, be related to the consideration in the Baldinger case, where Advocate
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer took the following ground in his Opinion dated 11
December 2003:59 ‘Although citizenship of the Union is not itself capable of conferring
the full range of rights which are traditionally attached to membership of a political
community, it must at least guarantee that it is possible to change nationality within the
European Union without suffering any legal disadvantage’. Placed against the back-
ground of current migration law—partly controlled by national institutions, partly at
the European level; see, for example, the Directive on Family Reunification60—this
could be perceived as being very pregnant indeed. For example, if a legal relationship
is first considered to be an ‘internal Belgian matter’, but is then classified as an
‘intra-Community matter’ by the exercise of the right of free movement, after which it
becomes ‘an internal Dutch matter’ by naturalisation, could the persons involved lose
the ‘acquired’ family reunification rights they held under Belgian or European law, and
could the regime applicable to them change to such an extent that it would be unat-
tractive for them to opt for acquiring Dutch nationality by naturalisation, if it turns
out, for example, that the possibilities of having a non-European partner come over will
change to a great extent? The question arises as to what extent the European legislator
56 C-370/90, Singh [1992] ECR I-4265 and C-109/01, Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. Another case worth
mentioning is C-1/05, Jia [2007] ECR Page I-1.
57 Also on the basis of the analysis of the Baldinger case, it turns out that, in specific cases, considering
specific rights as a ‘social advantage’ may offer a solution, but that this is not always the case. In this
context, see also the Reed case (Case 59/85, [1986] ECR 1283).
58 Likewise, it was also considered in Garcia Avello, n 52 supra, para 36, that ‘. . . it is common ground that
(such a) discrepancy in surnames is liable to cause serious inconvenience for those concerned at both
professional and private levels resulting from, inter alia, difficulties in benefiting, in one Member State of
which they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in the surname
recognised in another Member State of which they are also nationals’.
59 Paragraph 47.
60 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 concerning the Law of Family Reunification, [2003]
OJ L251/12.
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will address such issues affecting EU citizens in the future, and how traditional PIL
arguments and views in relation, for example, to the concern for international harmony
and the preservation of rights in the case of migration should be assessed from a
European perspective, from the perspective of human rights promotion.61
In the current ‘European context’, ‘classical’ arguments and views would then have
to be evaluated, taking account of the views, for example, of the Court of Justice in
relation to ‘fraud’—for example in international company law, the Inspire case;62 see
also the Hacene Akrich case and the Jia case concerning migration law, including issues
about the possibility to maintain the national migration law—accompanied by the
European commitment to a ‘liberal access to justice’, etc.
III Conclusion
A Need for a More Profound and Broader Analysis
In the extensive version of this article,63 I have tried to explore the relationship between
PIL, on the one hand, and European objectives, such as stimulating the international
market, protecting the European fundamental freedoms, preserving the principle of
non-discrimination based on nationality, and, in addition, the position of human
rights, on the other hand. I have made a first attempt to position—in a fragmentary
way—the convergence or tension between ‘old’ (‘classic’) and ‘new’ (European) ten-
dencies to instrumentalise PIL and its interaction with human rights.
But the research should go much further. In my opinion, it is sensible to deepen the
analysis in the fields mentioned in that first study—both international patrimonial law
and international family law—and certainly to involve other fields in the analysis as
well. In respect of other fields, too, attempts could be made to position the doctrine and
significance of human rights in the area of tensions between European law and PIL. By
pursuing this line of action, it could become easier, in my opinion, to establish the
position that had best be adopted from the perspective of human rights promotion in
current PIL debates, and how, from the perspective of human rights protection, the PIL
discipline may attempt to represent PIL either as an obstacle to the internal market or
advance it as a tool that could be helpful in the process of European integration and the
encouragement of the internal market, what lessons can be learned from PIL, and, in
a more general sense, what may be expected from PIL in the context of human rights
promotion.
B Should PIL Emerge from its Cocoon and Enter a new Phase?
And this brings me to my initial definition of the question, in particular the question of
PIL as an exotic wallflower or a well-integrated participant in various companies and,
more specifically, the position that PIL may have for the purposes of the Refgov
project. It seems to be worth the trouble to keep an eye on some of the points
mentioned above and give further substance to these.
61 This touches on the interdependencies between European law, PIL, nationality law and aliens law.
62 Inspire, n 50 supra. See also C-212/97, Centros [1999] ECR I-1459 and C-208/00, Uberseering [2002]
ECR I-9919.
63 See also n 6 supra.
European Law Journal Volume 14
© 2008 The Author126
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
If one examines such questions concerning PIL, human rights and European law,
one finds oneself, as it were, ‘at the crossroads’ of various disciplines interacting with
each other; in this context, attention should be paid both to ‘classical’ studies and to
up-to-date studies concerning recent developments and dynamics, and the manner in
which these interact with each other. Both studies into the interaction between human
rights and European law—for recent publications on this issue, see the studies address-
ing the problems of the Omega case—and studies into the interaction between PIL and
human rights (old discussions, for example those relevant in the above decision by the
German Constitutional Court of 4 May 1971), and into the interaction between PIL
and European law (‘classical’ and ‘new’ debates, before and after the Europeanisation
of PIL) would ultimately have to be combined in an analysis of the interaction between
PIL, European law and human rights. This type of analysis had been partly carried out
even before the Europeanisation of PIL. For example, this could relate to analyses
about the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality in the confrontation
with the cautio judicatum solvi, or about the principle of ‘fair trial’ as a ground for
refusal for recognition in the Brussels Convention.64 At this juncture, after the Euro-
peanisation of PIL, debates are being conducted about questions raised in the context
of the Garcia-Avello65 and Grunkin cases,66 the legislation to be drafted in the field of
international tort law, the impact of the country-of-origin principle, the concept of a
‘community public order’, etc.
All in all, from the perspective of the Refgov project, which is focused on the
ambition to find ways of promoting human rights, the following crucial questions
emerge: what role may PIL be expected to play if human rights are to be promoted?
What position would lawyers wanting to promote human rights have to take in PIL
issues, and how should they take account of PIL issues? And what lessons can lawyers
‘learn’ from PIL as a discipline or the debates in PIL that may still be conducted?
If one tries to answer such questions, one defies PIL, as it were, to emerge from the
safe, snug cocoon in which the discipline has wrapped itself until now. PIL will then
have the opportunity to develop into a full-fledged and worthy participant in the
Refgov project and, more in general, to develop into a worthy participant in companies
of specialists of human rights, non-discrimination law, European law and comparative
law.
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64 In this context, see, e.g., ECJ 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98 Krombach, and studies thereon.
65 C-148/02, Judgment dated 2 October 2003.
66 C-96/04. The Opinion dates from 30 June 2005. Judgment dated 27 April 2006.
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